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1The Transvaluation of Critique in the Anthropocene
Abstract
This article considers the transvaluation of critique through the lens of the new 
affirmative critical approaches of the Anthropocene. The first section 
introduces the problematic of the Anthropocene as a new geological epoch 
and also as symptomatic of the end of modernist ontological and 
epistemological assumptions of the divide between culture and nature. The 
second section then highlights how the Anthropocene thesis poses a problem 
for critique through fundamentally decentring the human as subject and 
challenging the temporal claims of Enlightenment progress. The third section 
analyses the implications of this closure for critical approaches and the shift 
towards a more positive view of the present: no longer seeking to imagine 
alternative futures but rather drawing out alternative possibilities that already 
exist. Critique thus becomes additive, affirmative and constructive. The final 
section expands on this point and concludes with a consideration of how 
contemporary theoretical approaches articulate the transvaluation of critique. 
Introduction: A New Epoch
This article argues that the importance of the concept of the Anthropocene,1 
for the transvaluing of critique in the sphere of global studies and international 
relations, has as yet not been fully recognised.2 Perhaps one reason for this is 
the lack of historical comparison for the transformation of social, political and 
ethical thought that the Anthropocene is held to bring in its train.3 This 
transformation performs a transvaluation of critique (in Nietzsche’s sense of 
the term); it is not merely the means of critique (tactics or strategy) that are 
problematized but the ends themselves, which are revalued.4 Unlike 
modernist critique, which, since the Enlightenment, sought to transform the 
world to put human reasoning and transformative agency at the centre, 
contemporary radical critique seeks to transform (or decentre) the human in 
1 A concept coined by Eugene Stormer in the 1980s and popularised by Paul 
Crutzen in the 2000s, see Crutzen and Stoermer ‘The “Anthropocene”’, Global 
Change News, 41 (2000), pp.17–18; also Crutzen, ‘Geology of Mankind’, 
Nature 415 (2002): 23; Crutzen and Will Steffen  ‘How Long Have We Been in 
the Anthropocene Era?’ Climatic Change 61 (2003): 251-257.
2 The difficulties of raising the importance of the Anthropocene concept in 
International Relations is dealt with well by Cameron Harrington, see his ‘The 
Ends of the World: International Relations and the Anthropocene’, Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 44(3), 2016: 478–498
3 Perhaps the political, social and emotional creativity of radical thought when 
the world was ‘turned upside down’ in the mid-17th Century, amidst the 
English civil war, could be one comparison; see Christopher Hill, The World 
Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution. London: 
Penguin, 1991.
4 For example, Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘The Antichrist: An Attempted Criticism of 
Christianity’, in Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols. Ware: Wordsworth Classics, 
93-163.
2order to put the world at the centre. The world is to be affirmed as the 
transcendental agent, saviour, Gaia, or ‘last God’ and the human is displaced 
to becoming the adaptive, responsive, humble and resilient object of its 
commands. Critique is the conceptual field through which this reversal of 
modernist subject-object relations is negotiated. The goal of critique thus 
becomes that of ‘learning to adapt to the world’ or to listen to what the planet 
‘is telling us’, rather than to ‘hubristically’ seek to direct, shape or control our 
external world.5 In order for critique to be transvalued, to have the goal of 
affirming the world rather than of transforming it, modernist constructions of 
the world and of the place of the human subject needed to be shaken or 
disrupted in a radical, in the sense of fundamental, way. The discursive 
framing of the Anthropocene has been greeted as providing just this 
fundamental reassessment of modernist assumptions. 
The Anthropocene is a disputed term, which refers to a new geological 
epoch,6 in which human activity is seen to have profound and irreparable 
effects on the environment.7 This attention to a new epoch in which humanity 
appears to have impacted the earth in ways which mean that natural 
processes can no longer be separated from historical, social, economic and 
political effects has powerfully challenged the modernist understanding of the 
5 Anthony Burke, Stefanie Fishel, Audra Mitchell, Simon Dalby and Daniel 
Levine, ‘Planet Politics: A Manifesto from the End of IR’, Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies 44, no. 3 (2016): 499–523; 500; 507.
6 The previous understanding was that earth was in the epoch of the 
Holocene, which began at the end of the last Ice Age, 12,000 years ago. The 
Holocene is understood to be an epoch of relative temperature stability, which 
enabled the flourishing of human progress: the naming of the Anthropocene 
as a new epoch calls attention to how human impacts on the earth have 
brought this period of stability to an end. At the time of writing the International 
Commission on Stratigraphy had not reached a formal decision on the naming 
or dating of the Anthropocene as a new epoch.
7 Working Group on the 'Anthropocene', ‘What is the 'Anthropocene'? - 
Current Definition and Status’, QuaternaryStratigraphy. Accessed at: 
https://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/workinggroups/anthropocene/. These 
impacts include the emissions of ‘greenhouse’ gases leading to global 
warming, the collapse of biodiversity including debate about whether we can 
speak of a ‘sixth extinction’, the acidification of the oceans and changes in 
biogeochemical cycles of water, nitrogen and phosphate. The earth system 
scientists of the Resilience Centre in Stockholm list nine planetary 
boundaries: stratospheric ozone depletion; loss of biosphere integrity 
(biodiversity loss and extinctions); chemical pollution and the release of novel 
entities; climate change; ocean acidification; freshwater consumption and the 
global hydrological cycle; land system change; nitrogen and phosphorus flows 
to the biosphere and oceans; and atmospheric aerosol loading. Four of these 
are currently operating beyond the safe operating space and two are not yet 
quantified (Stockholm Resilience Centre, ‘The nine planetary boundaries’, 
Stockholm Resilience Centre. Accessed at: 
http://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/planetary-boundaries/planetary-
boundaries/about-the-research/the-nine-planetary-boundaries.html). 
3nature/culture divide, separating social and natural science, destabilising the 
assumptions of both. Thus it is argued that ‘nature’ can no longer be 
understood as operating on fixed or natural laws, while politics and culture 
can no longer be understood as operating in a separate sphere of autonomy 
and freedom. These assumptions, in both spheres, were central to modernist 
constructions of Enlightenment progress, which is now seen to no longer exist 
or to have always been problematic.8 Jeremy Davies argues that: ‘The idea of 
the Anthropocene makes this state of being in between epochs the starting 
point for political thinking.’9 As Bruno Latour, one of the most prolific and 
widely influential theorists articulating the Anthropocene as a break with 
modernity, highlights: the fact that it is science itself that appears to lead the 
questioning of modernist constructions of the world is highly significant, as: 
‘No postmodern philosopher, no reflexive anthropologist, no liberal theologian, 
no political thinker would have dared to weigh the influence of humans on the 
same historical scale as rivers, floods, erosion and biochemistry.’10
The concern here is to demonstrate the importance of the Anthropocene for 
the deconstruction of the foundations of modernist understandings that 
enabled critique based on human reason. Thus, for the consideration of the 
transvaluation of critique, it makes very little difference when the 
Anthropocene is believed to have started as a geological era:11 whether in 
1492 with Columbus and the European holocaust in the Americas;12 in 1784 
with the invention of the steam engine by James Watt, that ushered in the 
8 Bruno Latour, ‘Agency at the time of the Anthropocene’, New Literary History 
45 (2014): 1-18; Neil Clark, Inhuman Nature: Sociable Life on a Dynamic 
Planet. Sage Publications, 2010, Kindle Edition; Donna Haraway, 
‘Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making Kin’, 
Environmental Humanities 6 (2015): 159–65; James D Proctor, ‘Saving nature 
in the Anthropocene’, Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences 3 
(2013): 83–92; Eric Swyngedouw, ‘Whose environment? The end of nature, 
climate change and the process of post-politicization, Ambiente & Sociedade 
14 (2011): 2. Accessed at: 
http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1414-
753X2011000200006; Robert Macfarlane, ‘Generation Anthropocene: How 
humans have altered the planet for ever’, Guardian, 1 April, 2016. Accessed 
at: http://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/01/generation-anthropocene-
altered-planet-for-ever; Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, The 
Shock of the Anthropocene. London: Verso, 2016.
9 Jeremy Davies, The Birth of the Anthropocene. Oakland, CA: University of 
California Press, 2016, p.5.
10 Latour, Six Lectures on the Political Theology of Nature: Being the Gifford 
Lectures on Natural Religion, Edinburgh, 18th-28th of February 2013 (draft 
version 1-3-13), p.77.
11 Any attempt to quantify a political shift in understandings via geological 
markings or historical events is inevitably going to be unsatisfactory as it is 
impossible to demarcate a change empirically, when the key aspect is the 
changing interpretation of the facts rather than the facts themselves.
12 Simon L Lewis S and Mark A Maslin, ‘Defining the Anthropocene’, Nature 
519 (2015): 171-80.
4industrial revolution; with the explosion of the atom bomb in 1945; or with the 
‘Great Acceleration’, the spread of industrialization across the world since.13 
The conclusion of the discussion, regardless of dating, is a shared one: that 
today human history cannot be understood as separate to geological 
history.14
Natural time is no longer somehow slow in comparison to the speed of human 
or cultural time. ‘What is sure is that glaciers appear to slide quicker, ice to 
melt faster, species to disappear at a greater speed, than the slow, gigantic, 
majestic, inertial pace of politics, consciousness and sensibilities.’15 Nature or 
the ‘environment’ is no longer to be seen as merely the ‘background’, but is 
itself a ‘protagonist’.16 Thus, the division between agential ‘man’ and passive 
‘nature’ is fundamentally challenged, with catastrophic events which seemed 
to be exceptional or highly improbable in the past, becoming increasingly 
regular, even in the advanced West: ‘…in the era of global warming, nothing 
is really far away; there is no place where the orderly expectations of 
bourgeois life hold unchallenged sway.’17 As Amitav Ghosh powerfully notes, 
expectations of normality, balance and order that defined the modern world 
view, appear from today’s vantage point to be a terrible error or hubris: one 
carried to the point of ‘great derangement’.18 There is a contemporary 
consensus that: ‘There can be no more talk of a linear and inexorable 
progress’.19
For Timothy Morton: ‘In an age of global warming, there is no background, 
and thus there is no foreground. It is the end of the world, since worlds 
depend on backgrounds and foregrounds.’20 What was taken for granted is 
now revealed to be much more contingent, fragile and unpredictable; for 
Morton, the world is no longer an object, fixed, passive and external to us, 
thus there can be no such thing as a human ‘lifeworld’ shaped within this.21 
Another way of expressing a similar idea is to note that the positions are 
reversed, as the background becomes foreground. As Latour states: ‘what 
was until now a mere décor for human history is becoming the principal 
13 For discussion, see Bonneuil and Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene, 
pp.14-18.
14 Ibid.; pp.32-33.
15 Latour, Facing Gaia, p.129.
16 Amitav Ghosh, The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the 
Unthinkable. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016, p.6.
17 Ibid.; p.26.
18 Ibid.: p.36.
19 Bonneuil and Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene, p.21.
20 Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the 
World. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013, p.99.
21 ‘…there is no meaningfulness possible in a world without a foreground-
background distinction. Worlds need horizons and horizons need 
backgrounds, which need foregrounds… We have no world because the 
objects that functioned as invisible scenery have dissolved. (Ibid. p.104)
5actor’.22 So much so that it could be said that the Anthropocene does not just 
overcome the culture/nature divide, ‘it bypasses it entirely’:23
…everything that was part of the background has now melted into the 
foreground. There is no environment any more, and thus no longer a 
need for environmentalism. We are post-natural for good. With the end of the 
political epistemology of the past that insured the presence of an 
indisputable outside arbiter – namely, Nature known by Science – we 
are left without a land and without a body politic.24
It is striking that in order to appreciate how critique turns into affirmation and 
how the human is no longer constructed as subject with the world as object, it 
makes little difference how we understand the causal drivers of the 
Anthropocene: whether responsibility lies with the Enlightenment, with 
capitalism,25 with modernity, with mass consumerism, with the organisation, 
industrialization and commercialization of agriculture, with colonialism and 
imperialism, with economic theory, with the extraction of and dependency 
upon fossil fuels, with the rise of the military-industrial complex etc.26 
Regardless of where authors stand on the allocation of blame or responsibility 
for the contemporary condition - or whether it is named Anthropocene, 
Capitalocene27 or by some other concept, such as Donna Haraway’s 
‘Chthulucene’ - the descriptive and analytical conclusions fall into a similar set 
of ontological framings. Whatever the driving forces, the conclusion is 
common across them, that there is no longer a separation between culture 
and nature: there is no longer an ‘outside’ or an ‘away’.28 What happens 
‘sticks’ with us, like Styfroam cups or plastic bags that stay in the environment 
and do not degrade in a human lifetime.29
The Anthropocene thesis thus ‘de-ontologizes’ the distinction between human 
culture and nature; this divide instead appears ‘as a epistemological product 
mistakenly presumed as a given fact of being’.30 This transformation in the 
22 Latour, Facing Gaia, p.4; see also p.63; p.100.
23 Ibid.: p.78.
24 Ibid.: p.125.
25 See Jason W Moore, Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the 
Accumulation of Capital. London: Verso, 2015.
26 See the extensive discussion in Bonneuil and Fressoz, The Shock of the 
Anthropocene, who provide seven, in depth, historical narratives.
27 See Moore (ed.) Anthropocene or Capitalocene: Nature, History, and the 
Crisis of Capitalism. Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2016.
28 See further, Gideon Baker, this issue.
29 Morton, Hyperobjects, p.1; p.60. As Myra Hird and Alexander Zahara note 
(‘The Arctic Wastes’, in R Grusin (ed.) Anthropocene Feminism. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2017, 121-145, p.123): ‘waste constitutes 
perhaps the most abundant and enduring trace of the human for epochs to 
come’.
30 Etienne Turpin, ‘Introduction: Who Does the Earth Think It Is, Now?’, in 
Turpin (ed.) Architecture in the Anthropocene: Encounters Among Design, 
6relation between the human as subject and the world as object transforms or 
transvalues critique. The next section of this article examines how the 
Anthropocene, or the intrusion of Gaia and hyperobjects, is seen to confront 
and end modernist understandings of critique. The sections that follow on 
from this illustrate how critique is increasingly affirming ‘life in the ruins’, after 
the crisis and the demise of modernity. And finally, how this represents a 
transvaluation of critique, in which left and right politics occupy the 
background and the world comes into the foreground as the key political 
subject or agency.
The Anthropocene: After Critique
To grasp the new critical discourses of the Anthropocene, they need to be 
placed in the context of a broad demand that we accept that the way we 
understand the world has to change along with the way in which we act within 
it. The Anthropocene, in this respect, symbolises more than the threat of 
global warming - rather global warming is seen as the harbinger of a new 
awareness of our more humble position in the world: the end of the reassuring 
assumptions of liberal modernity. To be more precise, it is held that modernity 
itself was never how we understood it to be. As Bruno Latour has pointed out, 
modernity was a paradoxical condition, in that the more that we imagined 
ourselves as subjects separated from the world, developing knowledge of how 
we could direct and control ‘natural’ processes, the more humanity grew 
entangled within these processes. Modernity itself was the midwife to 
processes that were no longer ‘natural’ nor amenable to external control or 
direction by human subjects seen to have all the powers of agency while the 
rest of the world - of nonhumans – was seen to be merely passive objects of 
our intentionality.31 As Timothy Morton argues, the awareness of human-
induced climate change and of our dependence upon nonhuman agency has 
‘done what two and a half decades of postmodernism failed to do, remove 
humans from the centre of [our] conceptual world’.32
Deep Time, Science and Philosophy. Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 
2013, 3-10; 3-4.
31 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1993; Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into 
Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004.
32 Morton, Hyperobjects, p.181. It is important to note that this position has 
been criticised by those who share these conclusions but see theorists like 
Latour and Morton as dismissing the existence of a rich non-Western tradition 
of thought which was never ‘modern’ in terms of the centrality of the 
culture/nature divide and to which decolonial and other ‘post-critical’ 
approaches in global and international studies are increasingly paying heed. 
See, for example, Déborah Danowski and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, The 
Ends of the World. Cambridge: Polity, 2017; Zoe Todd, ‘An Indigenous 
Feminist’s Take On The Ontological Turn: ‘Ontology’ Is Just Another Word 
For Colonialism’, Journal of Historical Sociology 29(1) 2016: 4-22; David L. 
Blaney and Arlene B. Tickner, ‘Worlding, Ontological Politics and the 
Possibility of a Decolonial IR’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 
45(3) 2017: 293–311.
7Isabelle Stengers captures well the shift at stake, in her argument that it is ‘as 
if we were suspended between two histories’ both of which describe the world 
in global and interconnected terms.33 In one history, governance frameworks 
are clear, based on clear evidence and with straightforward goals of economic 
growth and social progress. The other seems much less clear with regard to 
what governance requires or how to respond to ongoing processes of change. 
In this sense, as Haraway argues, it makes more sense to see the 
Anthropocene as a ‘boundary event’ rather than an epoch: ‘The Anthropocene 
marks severe discontinuities; what comes after will not be like what came 
before.’34 Latour eloquently describes what is at stake in this shift beyond the 
boundary, in the recognition of the Anthropocene:
What is so depressing in reading the documents of the sub-
commission on stratigraphy, is that it runs through exactly the same items 
you could have read in any 20th century listing of all the glorious things 
that humans have done in ‘mastering nature,’ except that today the glory is 
gone, and both the master and the slave – that is, humans as well as nature 
– have been melted together and morphed into strange new geological 
– I mean geostorical – forces.35
This is echoed by Nigel Clark’s view that ‘the Anthropocene – viewed in all its 
disastrousness – confronts “the political” with forces and events that have the 
capacity to undo the political, along with every other human achievement, by 
removing the very grounds on which we might convene and strategize’.36
As Bonneuil and Fressoz state, the Anthropocene is not a transitory crisis: 
‘the Anthropocene is a point of no return. It indicates a geological bifurcation 
with no foreseeable return to the normality of the Holocene.’37 Clive Hamilton 
writes: ‘it can no longer be maintained that humans make their own history’.38 
In this respect, the Anthropocene appears to confirm that we are living in an 
age of ‘manufactured uncertainty’ or ‘manufactured risk’; in which societal 
33 Isabelle Stengers, In Catastrophic Times: Resisting the Coming Barbarism. 
Paris: Open Humanities Press, 2015, p.17.
34 Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene. 
Durham: Duke University Press, 2016, p.100.
35 Latour, Facing Gaia, pp.76-77. As Claire Colebrook notes, ‘We Have 
Always Been Post-Anthropocene: The Anthropocene Counterfactual’, in R 
Grusin (ed.) Anthropocene Feminism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2017, 1-20, p.16, discussion of the Anthropocene, ‘lends more weight 
to Walter Benjamin’s claim that every document of civilization is a document 
of barbarism.’
36 Clark, ‘Geo-politics and the disaster of the Anthropocene’, The Sociological 
Review, 62 (2014) S1: 19-37, p.28.
37 Bonneuil and Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene, p.21
38 Clive Hamilton, ‘Human Destiny in the Anthropocene’, in C Hamilton, C 
Bonneuil and F Gemenne (eds) The Anthropocene and the Global 
Environmental Crisis: Rethinking Modernity in a New Epoch. Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2015, 32-43, p.35.
8threats can no longer be seen as external but rather are immanent to social 
processes39 undermining the modernist separation between security referent 
and security threat.40 It is held that modernity comes up against its own limits 
with the end of the culture/nature divide: the end of a ‘nature’ of laws and 
regularities somehow external to human interaction. The Anthropocene is an 
era of ‘multiple entanglements’ according to Stengers, between natural or 
‘non-human’ forces and human (in)action, or, as Connolly describes this, of 
‘entangled humanism’.41 In the face of this entanglement, continuing to rely on 
modernist epistemologies, leaving us ‘armed only with the results of 
externalized and universal knowledge’ would be, we are informed, the road to 
‘doom’.42
In this more complex, contingent and inter-related world, the ‘reductionist’ 
causal connections, generalisations, and ‘lessons learned’, which shaped 
modernist critical ideas of progress and development, are no longer seen to 
be tenable.43 Without the ‘outside’ of ‘nature’, counter positioned to the ‘inside’ 
of ‘culture’, Enlightenment assumptions of there always being possible 
solutions and ‘happy endings’ no longer make sense, instead, if humanity is to 
survive in any recognizable form, new forms of political imagination need to 
be much more humble, ‘reflexive’ and ‘adaptive’.44 Isabelle Stengers calls the 
end of this division the ‘intrusion of Gaia’, the intrusion of natural forces into 
every aspect of social and political governance:
The intrusion of… Gaia, makes a major unknown, which is here to stay, 
exist at the heart of our lives. This is perhaps what is most difficult to 
conceptualize: no future can be foreseen in which she will give back to 
us the liberty of ignoring her. It is not a matter of a “bad moment that 
39 Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics. 
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1994, p.4; Ulrich Beck, World at Risk. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009.
40 David A Baldwin, ‘The Concept of Security’, Review of International Studies 
23 (1997) 1: 5-26; David Chandler, ‘Neither International nor Global: 
Rethinking the Problematic Subject of Security’, Journal of Critical 
Globalisation Studies 3 (2010): 89-101.
41 William E Connolly, Facing the Planetary: Entangled Humanism and the 
Politics of Swarming. Durham: Duke University Press, 2017.
42 Latour, Facing Gaia, p.9.
43 See, for example, Melanie Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009, pp.ix-xiii; Ilya Prigogine and Stengers, Order 
out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature. London: Fontana, 1985; Paul 
Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems. 
Abingdon: Routledge, 1998.
44 Jan-Peter Voss and Basil Bornemann B ‘The Politics of Reflexive 
Governance: Challenges for Designing Adaptive Management and Transition 
Management’, Ecology and Society 16 (2011) 2: art.9; Fikret Berkes, Johan 
Colding, and Carl Folke (eds) Navigating social–ecological systems: building 
resilience for complexity and change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003.
9will pass,” followed by any kind of happy ending – in the shoddy sense of 
“problem solved.”45
Thus, the lexicon of international political discourse is beginning to carry with 
it an asserted recognition of the Anthropocene as a fundamental challenge to 
previous epistemological and ontological assumptions about how we know 
and how we govern/secure in a world that is no longer perceived as open to 
linear temporalities of cause-and-effect.46 As Latour argues, the system of the 
Anthropocene or Gaia ‘is anything but unified or unifying’; it is ‘not a 
cybernetic system designed by an engineer’ but the product of multiple 
dispersed and interacting agencies, so there is no such thing as the ‘balance 
of nature’ or the ‘wisdom of Gaia’.47 We have therefore ‘permanently entered 
a post-natural period’ where traditional science, based on stability, laws and 
regularities can no longer help negotiate the problem: ‘Climate scientists have 
been dragged into a post-epistemological situation that is as surprising to 
them as it is to the general public – both finding themselves thrown “out of 
nature”.’48
The one thing that critical Anthropocene theorists agree on is that there can 
be no technical fixes. The Anthropocene is not a problem to be solved (in a 
modernist sense) but an opportunity to be grasped (for rethinking human 
agency in more humble and less hubristic ways). It is precisely because the 
Anthropocene is ontologically constructed as a critique of modernist 
discourses of problem-solving that there can be no ‘comic faith in technofixes, 
whether secular or religious’.49 No pretence of geoengineering solutions 
‘which will ensure that it is possible to continue to extract and burn, without 
the temperature rising’.50 No possibility of fixed relations capable of regulation 
in the imaginary of ‘spaceship Earth’.51 
However, some authors have understood the Anthropocene, and the rise of 
new digital technologies, as an opportunity for extending modernist ways of 
governing and enhancing human progress This idea of a humanist or 
modernist solution, positing the idea of a ‘good Anthropocene’52 is, 
45 Stengers, In Catastrophic Times, p.47.
46 See Madeleine Fagan ‘Security in the Anthropocene: Environment, 
ecology, escape’, European Journal of International Relations 23 (2017) 2: 
292–314.
47 Latour, Facing Gaia, p.81.
48 Ibid.: pp.81-2.
49 Haraway, Staying with the Trouble, p.3.
50 Stengers, In Catastrophic Times, p.8; see also Stengers, ‘Autonomy and 
the Intrusion of Gaia’, South Atlantic Quarterly 116 (2017) 2: 381-400, p.384: 
‘whatever the geoengineering method, it would require that we keep 
extracting and mobilizing the massive necessary resources, to keep on 
feeding the climate manipulating machine…’.
51 Latour, Facing Gaia, p.66
52 See, for example, Andrew C Revkin, ‘Exploring Academia’s Role in 
Charting Paths to a “Good” Anthropocene’, New York Times, 16 June 2014. 
10
nevertheless, anathema to those who seek to affirm the Anthropocene as 
‘after the world of modernity’. As Claire Colebrook states: ‘Any “good” 
Anthropocene would be possible only by way of countless injustices’.53 The 
modernist perspective is seen as the ‘managerial variant’ of the 
Anthropocene, where the concept could potentially be captured and ‘become 
the official philosophy of a new technocratic and market-oriented geopower’:54
Whereas it should mean a call to humility, the Anthropocene is 
summoned in support of a planetary hubris… [exemplified by] the 
Breakthrough Institute, an eco-modernist think-tank that celebrates the 
death of nature and preaches a ‘good anthropocene’, one in which advanced 
technology will save the planet… sentiments characteristic of early 
infancy, lie at the basis of such ‘post-nature’ discourse, participating in the 
dream of total absorption of nature into the commercial technosphere of 
contemporary capitalism.55
While for Bonneuil and Fressoz eco-modernism smacks of ‘early infancy’, 
Clive Hamilton argues that this view of welcoming the Anthropocene epoch 
with imaginaries of geoengineering is ‘reminiscent of Brian’s song on the 
cross at the end of Monty Python’s Life of Brian.’56 For others, such as 
Richard Grusin, the imaginary of the ‘heroic agency of geoengineering’ is 
merely another failed attempt to impose ‘many of the same masculinist and 
human-centred solutions that have created the problems in the first place’.57 
Simon Dalby asserts that any attempt to problem-solve in the manner of 
‘contemporary earth system science syntheses of the human transformation 
of the biosphere… [with its] assumption of separation as the starting point for 
governing a supposedly external realm is now simply untenable.’58
In response to this closure, new critical possibilities are held to be inherent in 
existing communal forms of living and socio-technological forms of 
interconnectivity and networked community, building on new ways of making 
connections and seeing relationships.59 It is this need for a fluid awareness of 
Accessed at: https://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/16/exploring-
academias-role-in-charting-paths-to-a-good-anthropocene/?mcubz=2. 
53 Colebrook, ‘We Have Always Been Post-Anthropocene’, p.18.
54 Bonneuil and Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene, p.xiii; p.49.
55 Ibid.: p.86. 
56 Hamilton, ‘Human Destiny in the Anthropocene’, p.41; see also Hamilton, 
Earthmasters: The Dawn of the Age of Climate Engineering. London: Yale 
University Press, 2013. 
57 Richard Grusin, ‘Introduction: Anthropocene Feminism: An Experiment in 
Collaborative Theorizing’, in R Grusin (ed.) Anthropocene Feminism. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017, xii-xix: p.ix.
58 Simon Dalby, ‘Autistic Geopolitics / Anthropocene Therapy’, Public 
Imagination 10 (42), 22 June 2017. Accessed at: 
http://www.21global.ucsb.edu/global-e/june-2017/autistic-geopolitics-
anthropocene-therapy. 
59 For example, J K Gibson-Graham and Gerda Roelvink, ‘An Economic 
Ethics for the Anthropocene’, Antipode 41 (2010) s1: 320–346.
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relations in their specific and momentary context that has enabled the new 
critical frameworks analysed in the following two sections. For Anthropocene 
epistemologies and ontologies, the actual existing reality contains much more 
possibility and potential than has been traditionally recognised by policy 
makers and academics.60 The task is that of engaging more imaginatively with 
the constantly emerging present, alert to the fact that these relationships need 
to become a matter of care, attention and opportunity.61 Thus, contemporary 
critical theory makes a fundamental break with previous, or modernist, forms 
of critique. This article analyses this shift and stakes out two claims: firstly, 
that approaches that conceive of our contemporary time as the Anthropocene 
increasingly operate on the basis of affirmation; and secondly, that this shift 
necessarily operates through the transvaluation of critique.
Critique as Affirmation: After the ‘End of the World’
This section argues that the Anthropocene is seen to call forth new ways of 
thinking critically. These are ways that are less human-centred or 
anthropocentric, driven first by the certainty that science and progress are 
enabling the move away from modernity and second by the need to affirm – 
rather than mourn – its ruins. These challenge the epistemological and 
ontological framings of modernity, from a position of radical scepticism 
grounded upon a new set of metaphysical certainties. For authors, like Latour 
and Morton, it is held to be the advances of science itself, which has revealed 
the world to be much more entangled and complex than modernity imagined. 
Science has itself called a halt to modernity in its recognition of the 
Anthropocene condition. In this respect, according to Morton, global climate 
change could be seen as a ‘saving power’ or a candidate for Heidegger’s ‘last 
god’, enabling humanity to come back to the world after realising the terrible 
errors of modernist assumptions.62 This return to the world is not a happy but 
60 See, for example, Hasana Sharp, Spinoza and the Politics of 
Renaturalization. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011; Elizabeth Grosz, 
Becoming Undone: Darwinian Reflections on Life, Politics, and Art. London: 
Duke University Press, 2011, p.77, p.183.
61 In this regard, the implications of the Anthropocene accord closely with 
perspectives forwarded by a wide range of critical theorists associated with 
posthuman, new materialist and speculative realist approaches among others 
(for example, Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013; 
Manuel DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and 
Social Complexity. London: Continuum, 2006; Diana Coole and Samantha 
Frost, New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics. London: Duke 
University Press, 2010; Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: 
Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. London: 
Duke University Press, 2007; Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political 
Ecology of Things. London: Duke University Press, 2010; Connolly, The 
Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and 
Democratic Activism. London: Duke University Press, 2013; Graham Harman, 
Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and Lectures. Winchester: Zero Books, 
2010.
62 Morton, Hyperobjects, p.21.
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a humbling one, ‘made precisely through our advanced technology and 
measuring instruments, not through worn peasant shoes and back-to-Nature 
festivals’.63 For Ray Brassier it is science itself that has ‘uncovered the 
objective void of being’.64 For Morton: ‘…our cognitive powers become self-
defeating. The more we know about radiation, global warming, and the other 
massive objects that show up on our radar, the more enmeshed in them we 
realize we are… Increasing science is not increasing demystification.’65
The Anthropocene, in fact, appears to be driven by new scientific advances, 
understood as enabling us to overcome the limitations of modernity. As 
Morton argues: ‘Science itself becomes the emergency break that brings the 
adventure of modernity to a shuddering halt’.66 William Connolly focuses on 
the geo sciences revealing that the Earth’s ‘planetary force fields’ - such as 
climate patterns, ocean conveyor systems, species evolution, glacier flows 
and air circulations - have always exhibited self-organizing capacities that can 
go through volatile and rapid changes. Thus the Anthropocene is not new, 
except in the fact that human impacts amplify the non-linear and interactive 
effects of these forces in increasingly unpredictable ways.67
The Anthropocene thus spells the end of science as the cheerleader for 
modernist discourses of progress, rather than the end of science per se. 
Science as uncertainty is seen to free us from narrow or blinkered approaches 
that assumed a ‘happy ending’ in the future, based on the assumption of a 
telos of ‘progress’. This is now off the table. It is the present not the future that 
is important.  There is no possibility of debating what the future ‘ought’ to be 
like ‘when it is the what is that obstinately requests its due’ (emphasis in 
original).68 There is no modernist future, regardless of whether we were ever 
modern or not, because we would need another five Earths ‘to push our 
endless Frontier to the same level of development as North America’.69
Perhaps emblematic of this shift, and the implications that this has in terms of 
moving from transformative to affirmative forms of critique, is Anna 
Lowenhaupt Tsing’s book, The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the 
Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins (2015). Her starting assumption is the 
end of the modernist dream of progress, based on the division between 
humanity and nature: ‘Without Man and Nature, all creatures can come back 
to life, and men and women can express themselves without the strictures of 
a parochially imagined rationality.’70 The importance of the book as an 
exemplar of the affirmation of the Anthropocene is that it self-consciously 
63 Ibid.: p.36.
64 Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p.25.
65 Morton, Hyperobjects, pp.160-61.
66 Ibid.: p.21.
67 Connolly, Facing the Planetary’, p.4.
68 Latour, Facing Gaia, p.126.
69 Ibid.
70 Anna L Tsing, The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of 
Life in Capitalist Ruins. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015, p.vii.
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does not set out to be ‘a critique of the dreams of modernization and 
progress’, but rather to think past their end; to take up the radical ‘imaginative 
challenge of living without those handrails, which once made us think we 
knew, collectively, where we were going’.71 The Anthropocene thus enables 
us to think ‘after failure’, ‘after scientific progress’, ‘after the end of the world’.
For Tsing, living with the end of modernist dreams of progress need not be a 
negative experience. Rather, we can come to realise that modernity itself was 
a barrier to living fuller lives. Our assumptions of progress, the modernist telos 
that striving harder would lead to collective betterment, now seem no more 
emancipatory than religious promises of justice in the afterlife. Precarious and 
contingent life in modernity’s ‘ruins’ can be empowering and creative, full of 
new possibilities which modernity foreclosed. As Tsing states: ‘Progress is a 
forward march, drawing other kinds of time into its rhythms. Without that 
driving beat, we might notice other temporal patterns… agnostic about where 
we are going, we might look for what has been ignored because it never fit the 
time line of progress.’72 Her work, therefore, is constructed as a work of 
enablement, allowing the reader to make the transition from mourning 
modernity to embracing its demise:
I find myself surrounded by patchiness, that is, a mosaic of open-ended 
assemblages of entangled ways of life, with each further opening into a 
mosaic of temporal rhythms and spatial arcs. I argue that only an 
appreciation of current precarity as an earthwide condition allows us to 
notice this – the situation of the world. As long as authoritative analysis 
requires assumptions of growth, experts don't see the heterogeneity of 
space and time, even when it is obvious to ordinary participants and 
observers… To appreciate the patchy unpredictability associated with our 
current condition, we need to reopen our imaginations.73 
Critical approaches of the Anthropocene are thus affirmative and constructive 
rather than deconstructive.74 As Bruno Latour declared, in his widely cited 
2004 article ‘Why Has Critique Run out of Steam?’, critique needs to be 
transformed, from detracting and deconstructing to an ethos of adding to 
reality and constructing.75 For affirmative critical theorists, this world is fuller, 
livelier and more entangled than the soulless, simplified and atomised world of 
modernity. As Quentin Meillassoux argues, the Anthropocene welcomes us to 
the ‘great outdoors’,76 what really exists rather than what exists in the stunted 
modernist imagination. For Tim Ingold, the question: ‘is not how to represent 




74 See Pol Bargues-Pedreny and Peter Finkenbusch, this issue.
75 Latour, ‘Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to 
Matters of Concern,’ Critical Inquiry 30 (2004) 2: 225-248, p.232.
76 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of 
Contingency. London: Continuum, 2008, p.50.
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world ‘present’’.77 As Tsing argues: ‘Precarity means not being able to plan. 
But it also stimulates noticing, as one works with what is available.’78 The 
greatest tragedy would thereby be not the death of modernity in itself but 
rather the refusal to see beyond this: ‘If we end the story with decay, we 
abandon all hope – or turn our attention to other sites of promise and ruin, 
promise and ruin.’79 If we refuse to affirm the Anthropocene, we are told that 
we are left only with the choice of nihilistic pessimism or with naively repeating 
the tragedies of the past. In fact, the Anthropocene is apparently serendipity 
itself, enabling us to develop just the sensitivities and new ways of affirmative 
thinking and being that we need to adapt to our new condition:
What if, as I’m suggesting, precarity is the condition of our time – or, to 
put it another way, what if our time is ripe for sensing precarity? What if 
precarity, indeterminacy, and what we imagine as trivial are the centre of 
the systematicity we seek?80 
In the ruins of modernity there is more life than could possibly have been 
imagined by modernist human subjects convinced of their separation from the 
world. Our realisation that we can no longer go on in old, modernist, ways, 
enables us to appreciate rather than fear the Anthropocene condition. This 
drive to affirm the Anthropocene is particularly clear in the field of international 
relations, where leading theoretical journals, such as the European Journal of 
International Relations, seem keen to flag up critical work that highlights that 
the Anthropocene should not be confused with the problem of ecology or of 
climate change and thereby fitted into an extension of traditional modernist 
international security discourses.81 For example, Madeleine Fagan argues: 
This matters for thinking about security because to give the modern 
subject a home is to secure it; it is to reproduce the claims about 
universality and particularity that constitute the modern subject. Ecological 
security cannot offer an alternative to the account of security whose 
subject is the securing of the modern subject.82
Whereas modernist approaches read the Anthropocene as a problem of 
addressing climate change, critical affirmative approaches to the 
Anthropocene challenge international relations’ discourses of security and 
strategic thinking at the most fundamental level of the subject of security itself. 
77 Tim Ingold, The Life of Lines. Abingdon: Routledge, 2015, p.135.
78 Tsing, The Mushroom at the End of the World, p.278.
79 Ibid.: p.18.
80 Ibid.: p.20.
81 While there is plenty of interesting critical work on climate change 
governance, in the field of International Relations (for example, Eva Lövbrand 
and Johannes Stripple, ‘Making climate change governable: accounting for 
carbon as sinks, credits and personal budgets’, Critical Policy Studies 5(2), 
2011: 187-200), the assumptions are always those of modernist ordering and 
control, ones that sit much less easily with the very different critical work that 
is done in relation to the Anthropocene.
82 Fagan, ‘Security in the Anthropocene’, p.308.
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As Audra Mitchell states, in the same journal, it is ‘because IR [international 
relations] is so invested in human survival that it renders the assumption of its 
possibility unquestionable — and therefore renders extinction unthinkable’.83 
Importantly, she argues that rather than seeing the problems as solvable on 
the basis of alternative forms of securing, it is the drive to secure itself which 
is problematic; ‘only questioning the dogma of survival can enable us to 
critique this condition, and possibly (although not necessarily) to transcend 
it’.84 Modernist assumptions of securing the human against the world are held 
to be precisely the problem that needs to be overcome.85 
Realising our precarious condition brings us back to the world: the 
Anthropocene is like an unseen force, imposing a new sociability and new set 
of sensitivities on the basis that we are no longer separate, no longer in 
control, no longer not interested in other actors and agencies with which we 
cohabit. The Anthropocene is thereby less a world of doom and gloom and 
extinction than an invitation to be curious, imaginative, exploratory, playful 
even86 in the need to be attuned to what the world is telling us rather than 
focusing on what we want to do to the world.
The Transvaluation of Critique
Whereas, for the moderns, politics carved out a separate human sphere of 
freedom and autonomy in distinction from nature, for the no longer moderns of 
the Anthropocene the situation is reversed and it is the world itself that shapes 
and directs the content of politics. As William Connolly has argued, modernist 
social and political thought had neglected the ontological assumptions upon 
which it depended, treating them as a background that could be taken for 
granted.87 As considered above, it is precisely these assumptions that are 
challenged in the Anthropocene. A new set of ontological assumptions is 
beginning to inform contemporary social and political thought and thus the 
new modes of governance and critique, which this final section encourages to 
recognise and interpret as the transvaluation of modernist values. 
The new critical framings of the Anthropocene privilege the ‘is’ of the world 
over the ‘ought’ of attempts to carve out a separate human space. Modern 
politics was oriented around the problem of the ‘ought’, how the world could 
be governed or organized in ways in which humanity could prosper. The 
struggle (often broadly construed in terms of a continuum stretching between 
Left and Right) was also a contestation over forms of knowing and acting in 
83 Audra Mitchell, ‘Is IR going extinct?’, European Journal of International 
Relations 23(1), 2017: 3-25; p.12.
84 Ibid.: p.17.
85 See Scott Hamilton, ‘Securing ourselves from ourselves? The paradox of 
“entanglement” in the Anthropocene’, Crime, Law and Social Change, First 
Online: 29 July 2017.
86 See object-oriented ontologist Ian Bogost’s Play Anything: The Pleasure of 
Limits, The Uses of Boredom, & the secret of Games. New York: Basic 
Books, 2016.
87 Tsing, The Mushroom at the End of the World, pp.2-4
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the world. This contestation was cohered around differing assumptions of 
human nature, such as whether humans were rational or irrational, 
individualist or collective, and the extent to which states or governing 
authorities needed to intervene upon this basis. Today, this view of politics as 
a contestation over the nature of the human and how humanity can best be 
served is seen to be less central to contemporary concerns: and no longer as 
the ‘be all and end all’ of politics. 
Perhaps an obvious analogy could be made with how the struggles of the 
warring kingdoms of Westeros, in the ‘Game of Thrones’ TV series, begin to 
pale into insignificance in comparison to the looming collective threat posed 
by the coming of winter and the White Walkers. Like the coming of winter, 
entry into the epoch of the Anthropocene is held to displace the modernist 
framework and context of political contestation. Modernist politics assumed 
that the ‘is’ of the world would look after itself, i.e. that nature or the 
environment was just the backdrop or the stage for the great struggle between 
Left and Right. Today the positions seem to be reversed, winter/the 
Anthropocene is seen to push the politics of Left and Right from the 
foreground to the background. As Nigel Clark argues, ‘the impression that 
deep-seated forces of the earth can leave on social worlds is out of all 
proportion to the power of social actors to legislate over the lithosphere’ (the 
earth’s upper mantle and crust).88  The relation between humanity and nature 
appears to be reversed: 
What does it mean to say that life, or the earth, or nature, or the 
universe are not just constellations of material and energy with which humans 
forge connections, but realities upon which we are utterly dependent – in 
ways that are out of all proportion to life, nature, the earth or the universe’s 
dependence on us?89   
The reversing of the background and foreground is not entirely politically 
neutral. In fact, it is the aspirational politics of the Left, in its desire for greater 
freedom, autonomy and equality in social and economic life and for an 
increase in material wealth and its broader distribution, which appears to be 
particularly problematic. As Sara Nelson and Bruce Braun argue: ‘In the 
context of these entanglements it is not clear what autonomy means, 
politically or ontologically.’90
As evinced in the notion of ‘immaterial’ production and an 
emphasis on the revolutionary possibilities offered by cognitive and 
communicative capitalism, the material conditions of this new economy of 
extractivism and the globalization of manufacturing remained 
unacknowledged… The understanding of human potentiality… depends on 
88 Clark, Inhuman Nature: Sociable Life on a Dynamic Planet. Sage 
Publications, 2010, Kindle Edition, Kindle location 220-221.
89 Ibid: Kindle location 917-918.
90 Sara Nelson and Bruce Braun, ‘Autonomia in the Anthropocene: New 
Challenges to Radical Politics’, South Atlantic Quarterly 116 (2017) 2: 223-
235, p.224.
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a sharp distinction between life and nonlife, human and nonhuman, and the 
movement’s historical analysis and political imagination rely on a knowable, 
reliable, ‘always there’ nature that is neither used up nor filled with 
surprises.91
As Jason Moore has illustrated, one of the key problems for those who 
believe in material progress as the key to human betterment has been that 
capitalism did not just exploit unpaid labour power but also the productive 
power of non-human labour. Thus, for Moore, it is not only that, as Marx 
noted, there is a tendency of the rate of profit to fall but there is also a 
tendency for the rate of ‘ecological surplus’ to fall,92 with the depletion of 
energy and mineral resources.93 The drive to overcome boundaries to the 
appropriation of ‘cheap nature’ as well as ‘cheap labour’ gave capitalism a 
productive dynamic not based purely on the invisibility of human labour of 
unpaid reproduction (highlighted by feminist scholars, like Silvia Federici)94 
but also on the invisibility of non-human labour and resources (an invisibility 
which is now all too visible). What was seen to be the expansion of progress 
and human potential can be read as actually the extractive machine of 
capitalism ceaselessly seeking new untapped resources to exploit on the 
‘cheap’. This form of organizing nature has now reached its limits, ironically 
because of the resistance of non-human ‘nature’ rather than a rebellion of 
humanity.95 As Stengers notes: ‘Today all Marxist or post-Marxist scripts must 
confront a perspective of destruction that Marx could not anticipate… which 
deeply perturbs any theory indifferent to the new, dramatic restriction of our 
historical horizon.’96
Dipesh Chakrabarty argues that ‘logically speaking, the climate crisis is not 
inherently a result of economic inequalities’; if we had lived in a ‘more evenly 
prosperous and just world’ then ‘the climate crisis would have been worse’: 
‘Our collective carbon footprint would have only been larger – for the world’s 
poor do not consume much and contribute little to the production of 
greenhouse gases – and the climate change crisis would have been so much 
sooner and in a much more drastic way.’97 Similarly, part of the problem of 
91 Ibid.: p.229.
92 Highlighted as a ‘metabolic rift’ by McKenzie Wark (Molecular Red: Theory 
for the Anthropocene. London: Verso, 2015, p.xiv): ‘where one molecule after 
another is extracted by labor and technique to make things for humans, but 
the waste products don’t return so that the cycle can renew itself.’
93 See, Moore, Capitalism in the Web of Life, p.226.
94 See, for example, Siliva Federici, Revolution at point zero: Housework, 
reproduction and feminist struggle. Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2012.
95 See discussion in Jason Read, ‘Anthropocene and Anthropogenesis: 
Philosophical Anthropology and the Ends of Man’, South Atlantic Quarterly 
116 (2017) 2: 257-273.
96 Stengers, ‘Autonomy and the Intrusion of Gaia’, South Atlantic Quarterly 
116 (2017) 2: 381-400, p.383.
97 Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘The Anthropocene and the Convergence of Histories’, 
in C Hamilton, C Bonneuil and F Gemenne (eds) The Anthropocene and the 
Global Environmental Crisis: Rethinking Modernity in a New Epoch. 
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‘population’ is ‘due surely in part to modern medicine, public health measures, 
eradication of epidemics, the use of artificial fertilisers, and so on’ and 
therefore ‘cannot be attributed in any straightforward way to a logic of a 
predatory and capitalist West.’98 Any imaginary of capitalism paving the way 
to socialism as a more progressive system, as Stengers argues, needs to be 
rejected on the basis that it ‘would instead herald the perfect socioecological 
storm which systematic extraction is now unleashing’.99
As Amitav Ghosh asserts, colonialization can be understood to have held 
back climate change: if the European empires had been dismantled earlier, 
for example, after the First World War, there is every chance that the 
economies of mainland Asia would have accelerated earlier.100 Thus the 
concept of human freedom that developed with the Enlightenment is held to 
disappear in the Anthropocene, as it is realized that humankind can never 
shed its dependence or transcend its constraints:101 ‘…the Anthropocene 
challenges the modern definition of freedom, long conceived in opposition to 
nature… A freedom understood in this way sets human emancipation against 
nature, against the Earth as a whole.’102 For Chakrabarty and others, the 
problem of global warming and climate change challenges political discourses 
of progress, based upon social justice and global equality and freedom from 
oppression: there is a ‘growing divergence in our consciousness of the global 
– a singularly human story – and the planetary, a perspective to which 
humans are incidental.’103 Nelson and Braun argue that we are forced to 
accept that modernist or radical views of human autonomy and human 
freedom can no longer be credible today, ‘if the Anthropocene represents the 
farcical realization of human autonomy in the form of planetary devastation – 
in which the ‘production of man by man’ appears to lead to his extinction’.104 
Taking a broader approach to problematise modernist politics in its entirety, 
William Connolly emphasises that the problem is epistemological rather than 
narrowly ‘political’ – or to do with capitalism per se. Modernist political 
frameworks of Left/Right contestation lacked an appreciation of the planetary 
processes, which are recognised today. While thinkers of the Right and the 
Left may have fundamentally disagreed over many issues they all shared a 
‘sociocentrism’ or ‘human exceptionalism’, which placed humans as somehow 
above and separate from the world. They acted as if social, economic and 
political processes were all that mattered; that the ‘environment’ was merely 
the backdrop to the great human drama of social and political struggle. If the 
moderns considered changes caused by non-human forces and 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2015, 44-56, p.49; see also Chakrabarty ‘The Climate 
of History: Four Theses’, Critical Inquiry 35 (2009) 2: 197-222.
98 Ibid.: p.50.
99 Stengers, ‘Autonomy and the Intrusion of Gaia’, p.387.
100 Ghosh, The Great Derangement, pp.109-110.
101 Ibid.: p.119.
102 Bonneuil and Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene, p.40.
103 Chakrabarty, ‘The Anthropocene and the Convergence of Histories’, p.55.
104 Nelson and Braun, ‘Autonomia in the Anthropocene’, p.233.
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assemblages, these were considered to be set on a different and slower 
temporality than that of human or cultural transition and transformations:
Sociocentrism, in individualist, nationalist, communist, neoliberal, and 
republican traditions, assumes that a political economy is either in 
charge of nature, or that the limits nature poses to it are set on long, slow 
time, or, in a more attenuated version, that if we lift the human footprint 
nature will settle down into patterns that are benign for us. Given any of 
these assumptions, questions of agency, explanation, and belonging in 
practice tend to devolve around attention to internal cultural practices.105 
As Connolly and many other authors insist, modernist conceptions of politics, 
of belonging and community, of ethics and ideas of human freedom and 
human exceptionalism, based on modernist epistemological and ontological 
assumptions of reason and causal linearity all need to be reformulated and 
reconsidered. The contemporary consensus is that ‘the Anthropocene 
concept obliges us to embark on a deep reconceptualisation’ of the categories 
and concepts of political science, including the understandings of human 
agency, of history, of politics and of democracy:106 ‘Yet political theory, stuck 
in the Holocene, has been slow to recognise the Anthropocene and what it 
means. Most insights have come from philosophers and sociologists’107 less 
tied to the assumptions and binaries of the formal political sphere of states 
and citizens.
This shift fundamentally alters the nature of politics and governance. Politics 
is no longer ‘all about us’ in the sense of what we might think a just or 
equitable world might be and instead ‘all about the world itself’. Stengers 
captures this nicely in her view that, while the problems of the Anthropocene 
may be caused by the coupling of the material processes of capitalism and 
geological forces of nature, the brutal intrusion of the planet or Gaia means 
that ‘Struggling against Gaia makes no sense: it is a matter of learning to 
compose with her.’108 Stengers emphasises that ‘there is no choice’.109 This 
entails:
…cutting the link… established [in the nineteenth century] between 
emancipation and what I would call an “epic” version of materialism, a 
version that tends to substitute the tale of a conquest of nature by 
human labor for the fable of Man “created to have dominion over the 
earth.” It is a seductive conceptual trick but one that bets on the earth 
available for this dominion or conquest. Naming Gaia is therefore to 
abandon the link between emancipation and epic conquest, indeed even 
105 Connolly, Facing the Planetary’, p.20.
106 Hamilton, Bonneuil and François Gemenne, ‘Thinking the Anthropocene’, 
in C Hamilton, C Bonneuil and F Gemenne (eds) The Anthropocene and the 
Global Environmental Crisis: Rethinking Modernity in a New Epoch. 
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109 Ibid.: p.58.
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between emancipation and most of the significations that, since the 
nineteenth century, have been attached to what was baptized 
“progress.”110
For Stengers, the modernist discourse of “progress” and of the possibility of a 
“happy ending” is over, but this is far from a matter of regret, in fact, this is a 
real ‘emancipation’, our emancipation from modernist illusions of human 
exceptionalism. Rather than going to war against the Earth, through geo-
engineering and the mobilization of technological solutions, she suggests 
‘slowing down’, ‘caring for entanglement’ and ‘learning the art of paying 
attention.111 As an exemplar of the practice of critique as affirmation she 
emphasises: ‘it is also a matter of joy, sometimes dolorous joy, but joy indeed, 
when you feel your thought and imagination affected, put into (e)motion, 
attached to what was previously indifferent’.112 It goes without saying that this 
transvaluation of the ends of critique, encouraging joy in the present through 
the affirmation of what exists, rather than inspiring future-oriented thinking 
based upon the possibility of transforming and overcoming social and 
technical limits, depends on the acceptance of the Anthropocene thesis and 
the end of modernist assumptions. In a seemingly very different world, the 
Conservative British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher also famously declared 
that ‘There Is No Alternative’, articulating her own version of the critique of 
intervention to transform and adapt social processes to human-centred ends. 
Forty years later it appears that affirmation is gaining much greater 
acceptance, but it is Gaia’s planetary limits that must be affirmed, rather than 
the planetary limits of market forces.
Conclusion
Key to the current transvaluation of critique is the contemporary perception 
that modernity is over. The arrival of climate change and global warming, 
indicating a new set of problems and potential limits to progress and 
development, seems to have coincided with an already existing exhaustion of 
the modernist episteme, creating a potent dynamic.113 As Claire Colebrook 
notes: ‘The Anthropocene seems to arrive just as a whole new series of 
materialisms, vitalisms, realisms, and inhuman turns require us to think about 
what has definite and forceful existence regardless of our sense of world.’114 
110 Ibid.
111 Stengers, ‘Matters of Cosmopolitics: On the Provocation of Gaia (in 
conversation with Heather Davis and Etienne Turpin)’, in Turpin, Architecture 
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113 See Bargues-Pedreny and Jessica Schmidt, this issue; Bargues-Pedreny, 
‘Connolly and the never-ending critiques of liberal peace: from the privilege of 
difference to vorarephilia’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 30 
(2017) 2/3: 216-234.
114 Colebrook, ‘We Have Always Been Post-Anthropocene’, p.7. In fact, 
Richard Grusin, ‘Introduction’, p.viii, argues that ‘the concept of the 
Anthropocene has arguably been implicit in feminist and queer theory for 
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This is why, for many critical theorists, the Anthropocene appears as 
something that is non-negotiable. Jessi Lehman and Sara Nelson, for 
example, argue that: ‘In the Anthropocene, we are always already living in the 
aftermath of the event.’ The delayed dynamics of climate change mean that 
its impact is unavoidable while the entanglement of human and geological 
factors mean that human agency can never again be imagined in modernist 
ways.115 Stephanie Wakefield asserts that: ‘the crisis is the age. It is on this 
terrain of an exhausted paradigm – both historical and metaphysical – that a 
battle is underway.’116 This sense of modernity as ‘an exhausted paradigm’ 
has enabled the new formulation of critique in the Anthropocene to rapidly 
cohere and appear to be powerfully vindicated in every extreme weather 
event or unexpected accident or disaster. 
This article has argued that critical approaches in the Anthropocene can be 
increasingly understood as putting the nature of entangled being at the centre 
of politics rather than the designs or goals of the human as subject. The 
contemporary critical assumptions of the Anthropocene do not raise the 
possibility of alternative futures but rather of fuller and more meaningful 
presents, seeking to affirm the world as it currently exists. Any forwarding of 
alternatives would merely, once again, reconstitute the view of man as a 
knowing subject separated from the world. Thus, contemporary critical 
sensitivities necessarily affirm the idea that ‘there is no happy ending’.117 As 
Danowski and Viveiros de Castro note, today we appear surrounded by a 
cacophony of contemporary voices, with new and sophisticated arguments, all 
determined to ‘end the world’ and even advocating that the ‘real’ world, ‘in its 
radical contingency and purposelessness, has to be “realized” against 
Reason and Meaning’.118 There is little doubt that these nihilistic views are 
powerfully expressive of the underlying sentiments driving the new critical 
framings of the Anthropocene. It is these underlying sentiments, based on a 
real material experience of the defeat of left and transformative aspirations, 
which makes it difficult to assume any return of the modernist critical project.
115 Jessi Lehman and Sara Nelson, ‘Experimental politics in the 
Anthropocene’, Progress in Human Geography 38 (2014) 3: 444-447, p.444.
116 Stephanie Wakefield ‘The crisis is the age’, Progress in Human Geography 
38 (2014) 3: 450-452, p.451.
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